Le large sujet annoncé par le titre de ce livre laisse entendre, pour qui fréquente un peu la philosophie médiévale, que nous allons être informés des vues les plus récentes sur ce problème que posent les textes philosophiques médiévaux, dont on ne dispose souvent pas d’éditions scientifiques, dont l’édition scientifique ellemême pose problème, textes qui appartiennent à une épistèmè si radicalement différente de la nôtre qu’il est légitime de penser que toute interprétation contemporaine va irrémédiablement en escamoter un caractère essentiel. (...) Ce qui pose, on le devine, le problème de la possibilité de la traduction. Éditer, c’est déjà interpréter. Traduire aussi. N’en déplaise aux éditeurs, l’interprétation est toujours première. Interpréter, éditer, traduire, d’Étienne Gilson à Lambert-Marie de Rijk, de Lambert-Marie De Rijk à Alain de Libera et Claude Panaccio ces questions sont au cœur de l’activité de l’historien de la philosophie médiévale. Cette problématique essentielle n’est, nous le concédons, pas absente de l’ouvrage. J. Brams, C. Burnett, et dans une moindre mesure J. Decorte y font écho. Hélas, en nous laissant une impression de déjà lu. Cette constatation nous mène au cœur du malaise que provoque cet ouvrage. Le lecteur pressé risque de ne pas s’attarder sur les deux pages et dix lignes qui constituent la préface maladroite du livre et de garder ainsi l’impression d’avoir entre les mains les actes d’un colloque scientifique. Qu’il se détrompe! Les textes réunis ici ont été lus à Louvain-la-Neuve lors d’un séminaire de troisième cycle devant une poignée d’étudiants. Autant dire que la plupart des collaborateurs se sont contentés, comme de juste, d’exposer les résultats de travaux déjà anciens. Mais quel est l’intérêt de publier ces textes? (shrink)

Illusionism about phenomenal consciousness is the thesis that phenomenal consciousness does not exist, even though it seems to exist. This thesis is widely judged to be uniquely counterintuitive: the idea that consciousness is an illusion strikes most people as absurd, and seems almost impossible to contemplate in earnest. Defenders of illusionism should be able to explain the apparent absurdity of their own thesis, within their own framework. However, this is no trivial task: arguably, none of the illusionist theories currently on (...) the market is able to do this. I present a new theory of phenomenal introspection and argue that it might deal with the task at hand. (shrink)

In May 1968, Gilles Deleuze was an established philosopher teaching at the innovative Vincennes University, just outside of Paris. Félix Guattari was a political militant and the director of an unusual psychiatric clinic at La Borde. Their meeting was quite unlikely, yet the two were introduced in an arranged encounter of epic consequence. From that moment on, Deleuze and Guattari engaged in a surprising, productive partnership, collaborating on several groundbreaking works, including _Anti-Oedipus_, _What Is Philosophy?_ and _A Thousand Plateaus_. (...) class='Hi'>François Dosse, a prominent French intellectual known for his work on the Annales School, structuralism, and biographies of the pivotal intellectuals Paul Ricoeur, Pierre Chaunu, and Michel de Certeau, examines the prolific if improbable relationship between two men of distinct and differing sensibilities. Drawing on unpublished archives and hundreds of personal interviews, Dosse elucidates a collaboration that lasted more than two decades, underscoring the role that family and history—particularly the turbulent time of May 1968—play in their monumental work. He also takes the measure of Deleuze and Guattari's posthumous fortunes and the impact of their thought on intellectual, academic, and professional circles. (shrink)

Nanotechnology is an important platform technology which will add new features like improved biocompatibility, smaller size, and more sophisticated electronics to neuro-implants improving their therapeutic potential. Especially in view of possible advantages for patients, research and development of nanotechnologically improved neuro implants is a moral obligation. However, the development of brain implants by itself touches many ethical, social and legal issues, which also apply in a specific way to devices enabled or improved by nanotechnology. For researchers developing nanotechnology such issues (...) are rather distant from their daily work in the lab, but as soon as they use their materials or devices in medical applications such as therapy of brain diseases they have to be aware of and deal with them. This paper is intended to raise sensitivity for the ethical, legal and social aspects (ELSA) involved in applying nanotechnology in brain implants or other devices by highlighting the short term problems of testing and clinical trials within the existing regulatory frameworks (A), the short and medium-term questions of risks in the application of the devices (B) and the long-term perspectives related to problems of enhancement (C). To identify and address such issues properly nanotechnologists should involve ethical, legal and social experts and regulatory bodies in their research as early as possible. This will help to remove pressure from regulatory bodies, to settle public concern and to prevent non-acceptable developments for the benefit of the patients. (shrink)

François Recanati; IV*—Contextual Dependence and Definite Descriptions, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 87, Issue 1, 1 June 1987, Pages 57–74, h.

Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek and Peter Singer have recently provided an evolutionary argument for utilitarianism. They argue that most of our deontological beliefs were shaped by evolution, from which they conclude that these beliefs are unjustified. By contrast, they maintain that the utilitarian belief that everyone’s well-being matters equally is immune to such debunking arguments because it wasn’t similarly influenced. However, Guy Kahane remarks that this belief lacks substantial content unless it is paired with an account of well-being, and he adds (...) that utilitarian beliefs about wellbeing—e.g. the belief that pleasure is good and pain is bad—were probably shaped by evolution. Logically, de Lazari-Radek and Singer should therefore reject these beliefs along with the deontological beliefs that evolved. The present paper is a defense of their argument. After considering a number of unsuccessful replies to Kahane’s objection, I put forward a more promising solution: de Lazari-Radek and Singer should combine their objectivist view in metaethics with a subjectivist account of well-being, such as the desire theory. Such a hybrid account would tackle Kahane’s challenge because subjective accounts of value are immune from evolutionary debunking arguments. And it would be compatible with utilitarianism, which doesn’t fit very well with metaethical subjectivism. Before concluding, I deal with two concerns that this solution might raise: I argue that the desire theory is actually subjective enough to escape Kahane’s objection, and I deny that retreating to the combination of ethical objectivism and prudential subjectivism is ad hoc. (shrink)

The philosophical tradition in the West has always subjected life to conceptualdivisions and questions about meaning. In Vital Nourishment, François Jullien contends that althoughthis process has given rise to a rich history of inquiry, it proceeds too fast. In their anxietyabout meaning, Western thinkers since Plato have forgotten simply to experience life. In thisinstallment of his continuing project of plumbing the philosophical divide between Eastern andWestern thought, Jullien slows down, and, using the third and fourth century B.C.E. Chinese thinkerZhuanghi (...) as a foil, begins to think about life from a point outside of Western inquiry.The questionof how to "feed life," or nourish it, is the point of departure for the Chinese traditionthat Jullien locates in Zhuanghi. Life passes through each of us, and we have a duty to becomeamenable to its ebbs and flows. We must cultivate a sense of being adequate to it so that we canhouse it. Exploring notions of breath, energy, and immanence, Jullien reopens a vibrant space ofintellectual exchange between East and West. In doing so, he refuses to commit to a rigid frameworkof meaning, and his text unfolds as an elegant process that mirrors the very type of thought heexplores. Pointing out that it seems intellectually and politically imperative today to reinvigorateWestern thought with ideas from the East, Jullien seeks to create a space of mutual inquiry thatmaintains the integrity of both Eastern and Western thinking. Vital Nourishment is both a richintellectual historical journey and a text very much attuned to the philosophical politics of thepresent.François Jullien is Professor at the Université Paris VII-Denis Diderot and director at theInstitut de la Pensée Contemporaine. He is the author of Detour and Access: Stratgies of Meaning inChna and Greece, The Propensity of Things: Toward a History of Efficacy in China, and In Praise ofBlandness: Proceeding from Chinsese Thought and Aesthetics, all published by Zone Books. (shrink)

The classic essay on the "karesansui" garden by French art historian Berthier has now been translated by Graham Parkes, giving English-speaking readers a concise, thorough, and beautifully illustrated history of Zen rock gardens. 37 ...

In this chapter, we discuss social network analysis as a method for the history of economics. We argue that social network analysis is not primarily a method of data representation but foremost a method of discovery and confirmation. It is as such a promising method that should be added to the toolbox of the historian of economics. We furthermore argue that, to be meaningfully applied in history, social network analysis must be complemented with historical knowledge gained by other means and (...) often by more traditional, mostly qualitative, methods. It should therefore be viewed as a method that complements rather than replaces more established approaches in the history of economics. (shrink)

Many of the most influential theorists of linguistic justice make arguments on the basis of comparisons between language and religion. They claim either that (1) language, by contrast with religion, cannot be separated from the state or that (2) unequal official linguistic recognition, just like unequal official religious recognition, is morally problematic. This article argues that careful attention to debates about liberalism and the place of religion in public life invites us to question the two above-mentioned liberal assumptions about religion (...) underlying many arguments concerning linguistic justice based on (dis)analogies between language and religion. The hope is that such critical scrutiny is likely to shed some light on normative questions of linguistic justice, more precisely on questions about the legitimacy of granting more recognition to certain languages, usually those of national native groups (as opposed to groups resulting from more or less recent immigration). (shrink)

This paper investigates the influence of family control on the quality of labor relations. Using French workplace-level data, we find that family firms experience less frequent and less intense labor conflicts. Moreover, family involvement tends to offset the negative effect of labor disputes on corporate performance. We examine whether specific family patterns are conducive to better labor relations. We distinguish active from passive family control, eponymous from non-eponymous family businesses, and break down family firms into founder-controlled and descendant-controlled companies. It (...) appears that the benefits of family control are not attributable to a given type of family firm. These findings suggest that peaceful labor relationships are a peculiar attribute that families generally bring to corporations and extend our understanding of the “family effect” on organizational performance. (shrink)

In Why Tolerate Religion?, Brian Leiter argues against the special legal status of religion, claiming that religion should not be the only ground for exemptions to the law and that this form of protection should be, in principle, available for the claims of secular conscience as well. However, in the last chapter of his book, he objects to a universal regime of exemptions for both religious and secular claims of conscience, highlighting the practical and moral flaws associated with it. We (...) believe that Leiter identifies a genuine and important contemporary legal and philosophical problem. We find much to admire in his reasoning. However, we raise questions about two claims that are crucial for his argument. The first claim is that it is not religion as such, but conscience that deserves toleration and respect. The second claim is that respect for religion and conscience demands ‘principled toleration’ but does not entail stronger policies of legal exemptions. Against the first claim, we argue that Leiter does not successfully distinguish religious belief from secular conscience and morality; and he does not explain why secular conscience deserves respect. Against the second claim, we argue that the most promising theories of legal exemptions are not classical theories of liberal toleration. (shrink)

In this article, I revisit Pierre Bourdieu's concept of habitus and contrast it with Herbert Simon's notion of bounded rationality. Through a discussion of the literature of economic sociology on status and Fligstein's political-cultural approach, I argue that this concept can be a source of fresh insights into empirical problems. I find that the greater the change in the social environment, the more salient the benefits of using habitus as a tool to analyze agents' behavior.

Ce texte a déjà paru, sous une forme augmentée et corrigée, dans Le Social et le Sensible. Introduction à une anthropologie modale, Paris, Téraèdre, 2005, p. 101-118. Nous remercions François Laplantine de nous avoir autorisé à le reproduire ici sous sa forme originelle. Nous nous proposons dans cet article d'esquisser une confrontation entre une pensée de la vie et une pensée du social. Une telle confrontation s'avère problématique et délicate. Assez souvent soit elle risque de tourner court parce que (...) - Anthropologie. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to develop the notion of partial probability distributions as being more realistic models of belief systems than the standard accounts. We formulate the theory of partial probability functions independently of any classical semantic notions. We use the partial probability distributions to develop a formal semantics for partial propositional calculi, with extensions to predicate logic and higher order languages. We give a proof theory for the partial logics and obtain soundness and completeness results.

El concepto de mal, en cuanto intentamos acotar sus determinaciones, constatamos que no es sencillo: es tan amplio como el de bien, o como los conceptos de vida y muerte. Es cierto, además, que no es un concepto secundario, sino que va unido a su contrario y se presenta como alternativa a él: elige tu camino, el bien o el mal... Pero, ¿qué bien? ¿Qué mal? La cuestión existencial es vital: ¿qué escoger para nutrirse y no envenenarse, para protegerse u (...) orientarse? ¿Qué dirección, qué camino tomar? (shrink)

Cécile Laborde, philosophe française établie au Royaume-Uni, est déjà l'auteure d'une œuvre fournie et essentielle. Elle s'est, dans un premier temps, inscrite au sein de la philosophie républicaine, en publiant notamment Français, encore un effort pour être républicains! (2010), ouvrage en français adapté d'un livre précédemment publié en anglais, Critical Republicanism: The Hijab Controversy and Political Philosophy (2008). En partant des controverses liées à la loi de 2004 interdisant le...

Le principe dogmatique se caractérise par un « c’est-à-dire » qui s’autojustifie tout simplement par la nécessité de dire, un dire qui est traduire, verbe qui unit dans la même action de l’esprit « traverser » et « conduire ». Ce dire suppose et convoque ou rassemble, d’un même souffle, l’élévation à l’universel du langage dans le site concret de la différence et de l’inédit. En même temps, cet universel relève de la communication, et se refuse donc à tout achèvement (...) ou clôture, tout en visant un maximum de cohérence, ne cessant de donner toujours plus à vivre et à penser. The dogmatic principle is characterised by a “that-is-to-say” which is self-justified quite simply by the necessity of saying, saying that is translating, the verb which unites in the same action of the mind “crossing” and “leading”. This saying supposes and convenes or brings together in one breath, a raising to the universal of language in the concrete locus of the different and the novel. At the same time, this universal pertains to communication and thus refuses any completion or closure, all the while aiming at a maximum of coherence, unceasingly providing ever more to experience and to reflect upon. (shrink)

A summary of François Recanati's book Literal Meaning, followed by his response to the critical reviews of the same book by Stefano Predelli and Manuel García-Carpintero. /// Este texto da respuesta a los que, en este mismo número, Predelli y García-Carpintero dedican a mi libro Literal Meaning. En la primera seccíon hago un breve resumen de esta obra; en la segunda respondo a los comentarios críticos de Predelli y en la tercera a los de García-Carpintero.

Cet article se veut une critique de la thèse défendue par [Cleland 1993], laquelle soutient que la thèse de Church doit être rejetée puisque les limites du calcul dépendent de la structure physique du monde. Dans un premier temps, nous offrons un bref aperçu de la thèse de Church puis nous présentons l argument de Cleland. Par la suite, nous proposons une analyse critique de son argument, ce qui nous amènera à faire quelques distinctions conceptuelles par rapport aux notions qui (...) concernent la calculabilité. Finalement, nous montrons que les limites du calcul ne sont pas physiques mais bien logiques. En résumé, notre argument est que les limites du calcul sont déterminées en partie par le fait qu’une procédure effective doit pouvoir être décrite de manière finie.Even though Church’s thesis is widely accepted among mathematicians, it is nonetheless controversial. In this paper, we argue against the position of [Cleland 1993], which defends that Church s thesis must be rejected because the limits of computation depend upon the physical structure of the world. We first give a brief overview of Church’s thesis and then we present Cleland s argument. We then propose a critical analysis of Cleland s argu­ment, which will involve some conceptual distinctions regarding the notion of computability, and finally we will show that the limits of computation are not physical but logical. In short, we argue that computation is limited by the fact that an effective procedure must be described in a finite way. (shrink)

SummaryIn this paper I discuss two influential views in the philosophy of mind: the two‐component picture draws a distinction between ‘narrow content’ and ‘broad content’, while radical externalism denies that there is such a thing as narrow content. I argue that ‘narrow content’ is ambiguous, and that the two views can be reconciled. Instead of considering that there is only one question and three possible answers corresponding to Cartesian internalism, the two‐component picture, and radical externalism respectively, I show that there (...) are two distinct questions: ‘Are mental contents internal to the individual?’ and, ‘Are mental contents analysable in two‐components?’ Both questions can be given a positive or a negative answer, in such a way that there are four, rather than three, possible views to be distinguished. The extra view whose possibility emerges in this framework is that which mixes radical externalism with the two‐component picture. It agrees with radical externalism that there cannot be ‘solipsistic’ contents: content is not an intrinsic property of the states of an individual organism, but a relational property. It also agrees with the two‐component picture, on a certain interpretation: the broad content of a psychological state depends upon what actually causes that state, but the narrow content depends only on what normally causes this type of state to occur. In the last section of the paper, I deal with internal representation which seem to be independent even of the normal environment. I show that such contents are themselves independent of the normal environment only in a relative sense: they are locally independent of the normal environment, yet still depend on it via the concepts to which they are connected in the concept system. (shrink)

Foucault débute le cours de 1983, l’avant-dernier de son enseignement au Collège de France, par la lecture de Qu’est-ce que les Lumières?, texte auquel il confère le statut que Kant attribue à l’ Aufklärung, celui de Wahlspruch, à la fois blason, précepte et marque distinctive. On se demande comment le lecteur est engagé par la lecture qu’il expose aux auditeurs du cours. S’agit-il de se reconnaître l’obligé de ce que Kant envisage en termes de sortie, une redistribution du rapport du (...) gouvernement de soi et du gouvernement des autres? S’agit-il de s’approprier d’une manière inédite le mode kantien de l’attention à ce rapport en s’appliquant à un examen théorico-pratique qui sera à la hauteur de ce que l’actualité exige de nous? (shrink)

In developmental lexical–gustatory synesthesia, specific words can trigger taste perceptions and these synesthetic associations are generally stable. We describe a case of multilingual lexical–gustatory synesthesia for whom some synesthesias were bidirectional as some tastes also triggered auditory word associations. Evoked concurrents could be gustatory but also tactile sensations. In addition to words and pseudowords, many voices were effective inducers, suggesting increased connections between cortical taste areas and both voice-selective and language-selective areas. Lasting changes in some evoked tastes occurred during childhood (...) suggesting that some plasticity can be present after the initial learning of associations. Inducers were often linked to taste concurrents phonologically or semantically, but also through identifiable childhood episodes . Several inducers were phonologically linked to episodic inducers suggesting a process of secondary acquisition for many inducers. Implications of these observations are discussed. (shrink)